Transition from copper to fiber broadband: the role of connection speed and switching costs by Grzybowski, Lukasz et al.
HAL Id: hal-02102338
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02102338v2
Submitted on 8 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Transition from copper to fiber broadband: the role of
connection speed and switching costs
Lukasz Grzybowski, Maude Hasbi, Julienne Liang
To cite this version:
Lukasz Grzybowski, Maude Hasbi, Julienne Liang. Transition from copper to fiber broadband: the
role of connection speed and switching costs. Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, 2018, 42,
pp.1-10. ￿10.1016/j.infoecopol.2017.07.001￿. ￿hal-02102338v2￿
Transition from copper to fiber broadband:
the role of connection speed and switching costs
Lukasz Grzybowski∗ Maude Hasbi† Julienne Liang‡
December 6, 2016
Abstract
We estimate a mixed logit model using data on choices of broadband technologies by 94,388
subscribers to a single broadband operator in a European country on a monthly basis from
January to December 2014. We find that valuation of DSL connection speed in the range
between 1 and 8 MB/s is very similar. Moreover, in January 2014, the valuation of FttH
connection with speed of 100 MB/s is not much different than of DSL connection with speed
of 1 or 8 MB/s but it increased over time. The small initial difference in valuation of DSL
and FttH connections may be because basic Internet needs of consumers such as emailing,
reading news, shopping, browsing and even watching videos online could be satisfied with
connection speed below 8 MB/s. We also find that consumers face significant switching costs
when changing broadband tariffs, which are substantially higher when switching from DSL
to FttH technology. According to counterfactual simulations based on our model estimates,
switching costs between technologies are the main factor which slows down transition from
DSL to FttH.
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1 Introduction
In the last years, the European Commission has been pursuing the objective of providing fixed
broadband Internet access to all households in the European Union. But apart from universal
broadband availability, the Commission also increasingly cares about the quality of access in
terms of broadband speed. According to the Digital Agenda for Europe, by 2020, all EU
households should benefit of at least 30 MB/s connection and at least 50% of EU households
should have adopted 100 MB/s connection or more.1 In September 2016, the Commission further
announced that by 2025 all European households should have access to connections with speed
of at least 100 MB/s. To achieve this objective, the Commission proposed “a new European
Electronic Communications Code including forward-looking and simplified rules that make it
more attractive for all companies to invest in new top-quality infrastructures, everywhere in the
EU, both locally and across national borders.” According to the Commission, these investments
could “boost the GDP of the EU by an additional 910 billion Euros and create 1.3 million new
jobs by 2025”.2 Furthermore, the roll-out of high speed broadband access should enable the
development of new and enhanced digital services, thus raising consumer welfare and increasing
the competitiveness and reach of EU businesses.
Broadband services were originally provided using Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) technology
which relies on copper networks and offers speed up to 8 MB/s and cable modem.3 From
2010 onwards, telecommunications incumbent operators and new entrants in Europe started
to invest in fiber optic networks, which are rolled out up to the customer’s premises (Fiber to
the Home or FttH) and can carry video, data, voice and interactive video-telephone services.
FttH connections should offer speeds of 100 MB/s and more, which match the objectives set
out by the Commission. However, as of June 2015, about 70% of of EU households with fixed
1“A Digital Agenda for Europe,” European Commission, COM(2010) 245.
2Source: “State of the Union 2016: Towards a Better Europe - A Europe that Protects, Empowers and
Defends”
3The highest speed of DSL connection is 8 MB/s. ADSL2+ and VDSL provide higher speed in the range
between 8 MB/s and 50MB/s for premises which are located close to the exchange. Thus, these advanced
technologies are not available to all consumers.
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broadband connection used DSL connections.4 The main reason for such high share of slower
DSL connections is that alternative high speed technologies such as FttH and cable modem are
still not available to the majority of EU households. In countries where cable coverage is similar
to DSL both technologies have comparable market shares.5
Since the liberalization of fixed-line telecommunications markets in 1998, the policy and aca-
demic debates focused on how to regulate access to fixed broadband infrastructure owned by
the previous monopolists and incentivize firms to invest in high speed broadband networks. But
the relatively small share of high speed broadband technologies may be influenced by needs and
preferences of consumers with respect to Internet access and by difficulties to switch to other
broadband technologies. First, DSL users may not be aware at all which broadband technology
they currently use to access Internet and how quality of connection would change if they switched
from DSL to FttH or cable modem. With this respect broadband technologies may resemble
experience goods. Second, there may be substantial switching costs between technologies due
to transaction costs, opportunity cost of time and other, which may hold back consumers from
changing tariffs, operators and adopting higher-speed technology. Third, the price difference
between DSL and FttH services may be too high compared to the benefits perceived by con-
sumers to justify switching. Finally, the presence of indirect network externalities may also slow
down fiber adoption. On the one hand, consumers will switch from copper to fiber technology
if they can access new online content and services. On the other hand, new online content and
services will be developed only if there are sufficiently many consumers with high speed broad-
band connections.6 For these reasons, it may be a challenge to achieve the objectives set out
by the Commission on broadband access on time. According to the EU Digital Single Market
4Source: European Commission 2015 Digital Scoreboard.
5As of December 2014, only 6% of households in the EU had access to fiber, 19% to cable broadband and
4% to other fixed broadband technologies. At the same time, about 59% of households had access to DSL, with
large differences across Member States determined by the development of fixed-line infrastructure. Historically,
Eastern European countries had poorer fixed-line infrastructure and in result have lower DSL coverage nowadays,
as compared to almost full coverage in most Western European countries. Source: 2015 EU Digital Single Market
Report
6Baranes (2014) analyzes theoretically interplay between network investment and content quality on the In-
ternet.
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Report, in December 2014, only 26% of fixed broadband subscriptions in the EU had speeds
over 30 MB/s and 9% over 100 MB/s.
In this paper, we analyze the role of connection speed and switching costs between tariffs and
technologies in the transition from DSL to FttH. More specifically, we focus on the consumers’
choices of broadband tariffs based on DSL and FttH networks when both technologies are avail-
able at consumer’s premises. We use information on broadband technologies used by 94,388
subscribers to a single broadband operator in a European country on a monthly basis from
January to December 2014. We estimate a mixed logit model of demand for broadband tariffs
in dependence on tariff characteristics including price and speed of DSL connections, which is
calculated using information on copper line loss. In addition, we consider that consumers may
face frictions when changing tariffs and technologies due to switching costs which may therefore
slow down transition from copper to fiber technology. We use the estimated model to conduct
counterfactual simulations, which illustrate the relative importance of broadband speed and
switching costs for consumer choices of DSL and FttH connections.
We find that consumers face significant switching costs when changing broadband tariffs
and technologies. Switching costs are substantially higher when consumers switch from DSL to
FttH tariffs, which may be due to additional costs needed to set up the first FttH connection.
In particular, a consumer needs to make an appointment with an engineer who must visit the
premises to set up a connection. Our counterfactual simulation shows that adoption of FttH,
which stands at 29%, would be higher by about 25 percentage points in the last period in the
data in the absence of additional switching costs from DSL to FttH technology. In the absence
of switching costs between tariffs the share of FttH connection would not change at all, while
in the absence of both tariff and technology switching costs it would be higher by about 62
percentage points reaching adoption share of 91%.
Furthermore, we find that the valuation of speed in the range of 1 to 8 MB/s is very similar,
which may be because basic Internet needs of consumers such as emailing, reading news, shop-
ping, browsing and even watching videos online can be satisfied with connection speed within
this range. Surprisingly, the initial valuation of FttH speed of 100 MB/s was not much different
from 8 MB/s but increased over time. In January 2014, the first month of our data, the valuation
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of FttH connection with speed of 100 MB/s was higher by only 3% than the valuation of DSL
connection with speed of 8 MB/s and was higher by 7% than the valuation of DSL connection
with speed of 1 MB/s. In December 2014, the last month of our data, the valuation of FttH
connection with speed of 100 MB/s was higher by 59% than of DSL connection with speed of 8
MB/s and was higher by 66% than of DSL connection with speed of 1 MB/s. Increasing valua-
tion over time reflects growing need for high speed connections, which may be due to availability
of new online services and marketing of FttH connections. However, besides fast changes over
time, the ratio of speed valuations in the last month of the data remains far below the ratio of
speed values.
We use the model to conduct a number of counterfactual simulations. Assuming that speed
of FttH connections is 100 MB/s, in the presence of switching costs, the take-up of FttH would
not change at all if speed of all DSL connections varied between 1 MB/s and 50 MB/s. Also, in
the absence of switching costs, the take up of FttH would remain almost unchanged if speed of all
DSL connections varied between 1 MB/s and 8 MB/s, compared to the benchmark case without
switching costs. Moreover, relative to the benchmark case, the share of FttH connections would
be lower only by 14 percentage points, if speed of all DSL connections increased to 50 MB/s.
These counterfactual simulations suggest that switching costs between tariffs and technologies
are the main factor which slows down transition from DSL to FttH.
Due to lack of detailed consumer-level information on technology choices over time, the
literature on adoption of broadband technologies relied mainly on aggregate country-level data.
For instance, Distaso et al. (2006) and Bouckaert et al. (2010) use data on EU and OECD
countries respectively to analyze the role of inter- and intra-platform competition for broadband
diffusion.7 Dauvin and Grzybowski (2014) study the same question using more detailed NUTS 1
regional data for the EU countries. Among few studies which focus on fiber adoption, Wallsten
and Hausladen (2009) use data for 27 EU countries in years 2002-2007 and conclude that the
adoption of Fttx technology is lower in countries in which local loop unbundling (LLU) is more
7Inter-platform competition happens when entrants build their own infrastructure, while intra-platform com-
petition happens when entrants lease access to incumbents’ facilities via local loop unbundling.
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effective.8 More recently, Briglauer (2014) uses data for 27 EU countries in years 2004-2013 and
finds that more effective regulatory-induced service-based competition has a negative impact on
Fttx subscriptions.
There is also a growing body of literature studying substitution between broadband tech-
nologies based on individual-level data. For instance, Cardona et al. (2009) use survey data
of households in Austria to estimate discrete choice models for Internet access through DSL,
cable and mobile broadband and conclude that there is substitution between fixed and mobile
broadband. Grzybowski et al. (2015) estimate a mixed logit model for households’ choices of
broadband technologies in Slovakia and use the estimates of price elasticities to conclude that
mobile broadband should be included in market definition for DSL. In another paper, Srinuan
et al. (2012) use discrete choice model and survey data for Sweden and find that mobile broad-
band and fixed broadband technologies are close substitutes when they are locally available.
There are also a few studies which analyze the migration from old to new technologies. For
instance, Ida and Kuroda (2006) use survey data and estimate discrete choice model to analyze
migration from narrowband to broadband in Japan. In another paper also for Japan, Ida and
Sakahira (2008) analyze migration from DSL to FttH technology. They identify income, service
usage such as motion-picture viewing, and type of residence as primary determinants of FttH
subscriptions. They also conclude that there is a significant lock-in effect in technology adoption
but they study inter-temporal choice dependence using survey data from a single time period.
In this paper, we analyze the role of switching costs in the adoption of broadband technologies
following the approach in Grzybowski and Liang (2015). They estimate a mixed logit model
using data on subscribers to mobile services from a single European operator and find that
there are substantial switching costs between tariffs which reduce consumer surplus. In this
paper instead, we use a sample of subscribers to fixed broadband services. Some of them use
quadruple play tariffs which bundle fixed and mobile services. Our paper is also related to studies
which analyze the role of speed of broadband connections. For instance, Rosston, Savage and
Waldman (2010) use discrete choice experiments to estimate the marginal willingness to pay for
8Local loop unbundling is the regulatory process of allowing multiple telecommunications operators to use
connections from the telephone exchange to the customer’s premises.
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improvement in broadband services in the US in 2003 and 2010. They show that customers’
willingness to pay for speed is rather low and increases with education, income and on-line
experience. A US household is willing to pay 3$ more in order to enjoy ultra-fast broadband
rather than basic broadband. In another paper, LaRose et al. (2014) find a positive effect of
experience on speed valuation, which confirms that broadband technology resembles experience
good.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data used in
the estimation. Section 3 introduces the empirical model. Section 4 presents the main results.
Section 4.1 presents the counter-factual simulations results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Data
In this analysis we use two unique data sets, which were made available to us by a European
telecommunications provider of both fixed and mobile services. The first database includes
information on fixed broadband tariffs used by a few million customers from the whole customer
base on monthly basis from January 2014 to December 2014. Next, we kept only consumers
with premises connected to fiber network, i.e., consumers who are eligible to have FttH access.
We then randomly drew 100,000 consumers. Consumers who left the operator in a given month
were replaced by new arrivals in the same number. We lost a number of consumers during
data cleaning, mainly those using older broadband and mobile tariffs for which we do not have
information. The final sample consists of 94,388 consumers. These customers subscribed to one
of the operator’s broadband offers: (i) a ‘naked’ Internet access offer; (ii) ‘double play’ offer which
includes Internet access and fixed telephony over IP (IP Telephony); (iii) ‘triple play’ offer which
includes Internet access with IP Telephony and television over IP (IPTV); or (iv) ‘quadruple
play’ offer which includes IP Telephony, IPTV and access to mobile services. Moreover, we
have information on whether a consumer kept his fixed-line connection for voice calls (PSTN),
in which case he pays extra for it. For each consumer we also have information on the postal
address which can be linked to one of about 36,000 municipalities in France. Moreover, for each
quadruple play consumer we know the remaining commitment period in months.
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For 58,455 customers in this sample we have information on the copper line quality in terms
of the copper line loss measured in decibel as of December 2010 and December 2013.9 The
copper line loss determines the speed of DSL connection which may take approximate values
of 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 MB/s.10 Importantly, the price for DSL access does not depend on speed.
Besides, the speed of FttH connection is approximately 100 MB/s and is not dependent on the
distance from the consumer’s house to the exchange.
The second database includes information on: (i) all the new fixed broadband offers based
on DSL and FttH technologies which were available in each month during the period of our
analysis and (ii) old tariffs which consumers still use but which cannot be selected anymore in
the period of our analysis. For each fixed broadband offer, we have information on price and
other attributes. In addition, for quadruple play offers the attributes include services which are
available on mobile phones. In particular, we have information on voice and data allowance,
whether handset subsidy is included in the offer and what is the contractual commitment length.
We also know whether the offer can only be purchased on the operator’s website. The information
on available tariffs is used to create choice set for each consumer.
These two data sets are completed with additional municipality-level information. For each
municipality, we know whether there is a cable network available which was upgraded to FttLA
(Fiber to the Last Amplifier) that can provide high speed broadband connection of above 30
MB/s. This information was extracted from the websites of cable operators and is merged with
the consumer-level data using unique municipality codes. We also extracted information on the
availability of other fiber operators in the municipalities. But since they are available in the
same municipalities in which our operator deployed FttH, this information is not useful in the
estimation.
9Broadband signals from the exchange suffer attenuation as they travel along the copper line from the exchange
to customer’s house, which reduces the speed of DSL access. In general, the longer is the distance from customer’s
house to the exchange, the higher is the copper line loss. The copper line loss ranges from 1.5dB to 75dB with a
mean value of 27dB.
10In this analysis we ignore the fact that some consumers who live close to the exchange may use ADSL2+ and
VDSL connections which provide speed between 8 MB/s and 50 MB/s.
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The Choice Set
Our modeling approach is closely related to Grzybowski and Liang (2015) who study the role
of switching costs in consumer choices of mobile telecommunications services. We borrow from
their paper the description of choice set, switching costs and econometric model.
Modeling consumers’ decisions by means of discrete choice requires definition of choice set.
We construct the choice set for each month in the following way. ‘Old’ consumers, who were
subscribers to broadband services of our operator already in the first month of the data, can
decide to: (i) keep their old tariff; (ii) switch to a new tariff from the list of offers available in
a given month; (iii) leave their current operator’s services. ‘New’ consumers in the first period
do not have in the choice set option (i) to keep the old tariff. Consequently, the choice set is
different for most ‘old’ consumers due to different old tariff, but is the same for all consumers
who are ‘new’ in a given month.
We determine the set of new tariffs in each month using the subscriptions database. We
consider a tariff to be new whenever in a given month there was at least one ‘new’ consumer
who selected this tariff or at least one ‘old’ consumer who switched to it. Otherwise, the tariff is
considered as old and not available in a given month. Hence a new tariff in one month becomes
an old and unavailable tariff in the next month if there are no ‘new’ consumers who choose it
or ‘old’ consumers who switch to it. The total number of unique new tariffs in the time period
considered is 228 out of which 139 are quadruple play tariffs. The number of available new tariffs
ranges between 108 and 139 per month. The remaining tariffs to which consumers subscribe are
considered to be old tariffs. There were in total 122 unique ‘old’ tariffs used by consumers in
our sample during 2014.
A consumer’s complete choice set in a given month consists of new tariffs in this month and
includes the tariff which he used in the previous period. However, since consumers may not
be aware of all the tariffs which are on offer, an alternative approach is to limit the choice set
by drawing randomly a number of tariffs from the complete choice set. Due to a large size of
our sample and choice set, we estimate a model which consists of 4-5 choice alternatives. ‘Old’
consumers who do not switch tariff have the following choices: (i) their ‘old’ tariff; (ii) ‘new’
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DSL tariff which is randomly drawn from the list of offers available in a given month; (iii) ‘new’
FttH tariff which is randomly drawn from the list of offers available in a given month; (iv)
outside option to leave the operator. Importantly, the choice set of ‘old’ consumers who switch
tariffs must include the newly selected tariff.11 Thus, ‘old’ consumers who switch have in the
choice set as 5th choice alternative, the ‘new’ tariff to which they switch. ‘New’ consumers, on
the other hand, have in their choice set: (i) selected ‘new’ tariff; (ii) ‘new’ DSL tariff which is
randomly drawn from the list of offers available in a given month; (iii) ‘new’ FttH tariff which
is randomly drawn from the list of offers available in a given month; (iv) outside option to leave
the operator.
In general, consumers who do not opt for fixed-mobile bundles, i.e., quadruple play tariffs,
may combine broadband services from our operator with mobile services from our operator or
competitors. These services may be either prepaid or post paid. Moreover, consumers who
choose option (iv) leaving our provider may also mix and match broadband and mobile services
from other operators.
The utility which a consumer derives from these tariffs depends on a set of attributes. The
attributes of broadband only tariffs are: (i) the list price per month; (ii) access to the Internet
via DSL or FttH technology; (iii) the commitment length; (iv) fixed-line PSTN connection. The
attributes of quadruple play tariffs are: (i) the list price per month; (ii) access to the Internet via
DSL or FttH technology; (iii) the commitment length; (iv) whether a handset subsidy is offered
or a SIM card only without a subsidy; (v) whether voice minutes are unlimited and, if not, what
is the volume of minutes included; and (vi) the volume of mobile data in GBs included. In the
case of DSL, the additional information is the connection speed, which is determined by the
copper line loss of consumer’s connection. We construct a set of dummy variables for discrete
tariff characteristics and otherwise use continuous variables. Table (1) shows summary statistics
for ‘new’ and ‘old’ tariffs which are used by consumers in our data.
11We also estimated a model with choice set including all new tariffs available in a given month which greatly
expands the size of data. We were able to estimate multinomial logit model which yields almost identical results,
except for the coefficient of switching dummy which is greater in magnitude. However, the size of data does not
allow efficient estimation of mixed logit model.
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Switching Costs
Each consumer can: (i) stick to their current tariff and avoid switching costs; (ii) migrate to a
new tariff with the same operator bearing some switching costs; (iii)) stop using their tariff and
leave for another operator, in which case there are also some switching costs to bear.
Switching costs cause an inertia towards keeping a current plan, even though alternative
tariffs may be more attractive in terms of characteristics and prices. When a consumer decides
to migrate from their current tariff to a new one, the utility gain must compensate the disutility
associated with switching costs, and similarly when a consumer chooses to leave for another
operator. To account for this, we define three types of switching costs variables in the following
way. First, the switching costs dummy takes value zero when a consumer considers choosing
the same tariff as in the previous month and one for all alternative tariffs available in a given
month. This switching dummy is interpreted as the disutility from switching to an alternative
tariff, to which we refer as switching costs between tariffs. Second, the switching costs dummy
for leaving the operator takes value zero for the choice of all tariffs, including the one selected
before, and one for the choice of outside option which is leaving the operator. The lack of precise
information about what consumers do when they choose the outside option causes a problem
with the identification of the costs of switching to the outside option. This is because a dummy
variable for switching to the outside option is equivalent to a dummy variable for the valuation
of the outside option. Hence, this dummy variable represents a combination of disutility from
switching and the utility which a consumer gets from this option. The interpretation of this
dummy variable as switching costs is not appropriate and instead we call it leaving dummy.
Third, consumers who did not have FttH before may have higher switching costs because a visit
from a technician is needed to set up the first fiber connection. There may be also additional
costs for FttH users who decide to switch back to DSL. We refer to these additional costs as
switching costs between technologies.
In the case of switching to alternative tariffs, since there are no tariff dummy variables used
in the estimation, the switching costs dummy may also include the utility from these alternative
tariffs. However, if tariff attributes which we use in the estimation fully represent the utility of
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the tariff, the coefficient on the switching dummy can be interpreted as switching costs. The
consumer database includes information on tariff used by a consumer in each month. It also
includes the length of the remaining commitment period in months in the case of quadruple play
tariffs, which may influence the ability of the consumer to switch tariff or to leave the operator.
In general, consumers can freely switch tariffs during their commitment period.
Another problem with the identification of switching costs are unobserved time-persistent
preferences. Following Heckman (1981), consumer behavior may be state dependent because of
true and spurious factors, where true state dependency is a consequence of all observable factors,
including switching costs and spurious state dependency results from persistent heterogeneity
in preferences for brands. Consumers may continue using the same tariff because it better fits
their individual tastes. When spurious state dependency is ignored, the parameters representing
switching costs may be overestimated, i.e., state dependency in choices of tariffs appears to be
only due to switching costs. We allow for unobserved time-persistent individual preferences by
means of mixed logit estimation for panel data. We use two random coefficients in the estimation
on price and switching costs.
The total number of tariff switches made by consumers in our sample in 2014 is 46,760 out
of 992,550 monthly tariff choice observations, which represents 4.7%. There is some variation in
the number of switches per month ranging between 3.3% and 5.5%. Table 3 shows the number of
switchers in the database, which indicates that 60% never switched a tariff, 32% switched once,
7% twice and 1% three times or more. These numbers suggest that switching tariffs during the
period of one year is relatively frequent but less common than in the case of mobile services, as
reported in Grzybowski and Liang (2015).
3 Econometric Model
We estimate discrete choice model assuming that each individual in a given month chooses tariff
which maximizes his utility from the choice set described above. We use standard linear utility
specification which depends on tariff characteristics and observable and unobservable individual
characteristics. We account for the heterogeneity in preferences using random coefficients on
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price and switching costs dummy. The utility of individuals i = 1, ..., N derived from tariff
j = 1, ..., J in month t is given by:
Uijt = x
′
jtβ − αipjt + s′ijktγi + ijt = Vijt + ijt. (1)
where the price of tariff is denoted by pjt, and αi is the individual-specific valuation of price.
Note that all consumers are presented with the same prices of tariffs which are independent of
usage. In the case of broadband only tariffs, the vector x′jt includes the following variables: (i)
a dummy for DSL broadband; (ii) a dummy for FttH broadband; (iii) connection speed; (iv)
dummies for 12 and 24 months contracts; (v) a dummy for fixed-line PSTN connection. In
the case of quadruple play tariffs, the following variables are included: (i) a dummy for DSL
broadband; (ii) a dummy for FttH broadband; (iii) connection speed; (iv) a dummy for handset
subsidy; (v) a dummy for web only offer without commitment; (vi) dummies for 12 and 24
months contracts; (vii) a dummy for unlimited voice minutes; (viii) mobile data included in the
offer.
The vector of switching dummies is denoted by s′ijkt and coefficients γi represent the disutility
from switching which approximates switching costs. As discussed in the previous section, we
consider two types of switching dummies. The first one takes value zero if consumer i in the
previous month t − 1 used alternative k = j and otherwise value one when k 6= j. The second
one takes value zero for the choice of any tariff and one for the choice of outside option, which
is leaving the operator. This is disutility or benefit from leaving the operator. We also allow
for additional switching costs when consumers consider switching to other technology. For users
of quadruple play tariffs switching costs are also allowed to vary in dependence on the number
of commitment months left. We discussed the identification of switching costs in the previous
section.
Finally, ijt is the individual-specific valuation for tariff j at time t, i.e., the “logit error
term”. It is assumed to be identically and independently distributed over tariffs and individuals
according to type I extreme value distribution. The random coefficients (αi, γi)
′ can be written
as: (α, γ)′ + νi, where (α, γ) are mean valuations and νi ∼ N(0,Σ) is randomly drawn vector
from normal distribution with Σ being a diagonal matrix, elements of which represent standard
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deviations around the mean valuations. In our empirical analysis there are no observable indi-
vidual characteristics which influence the valuation of tariff attributes because such information
is confidential.
An individual i chooses in month t tariff j with the highest utility among all the available
alternatives, i.e., if Uijt = maxn∈Cit Uint, where Cit is individual i’s choice set in month t.
The expression for the probability that individual i makes a sequence of tariff choices and
estimation strategy are shown in Grzybowski and Liang (2015). The algorithm for estimating
a mixed logit model is explained in detail in Train (2003) .12 After the estimation, we conduct
counterfactual simulations and compute changes in consumer surplus after removal of switching
costs and resulting from changes in speed of DSL connections (see Small and Rosen (1981) for
the consumer surplus formula).
4 Estimation Results
The estimation results for mixed logit model are shown in Table 5. We estimate three model
specifications: (i) without speed of connections but with DSL and FttH dummy variables; (ii)
with speed of connections in logarithm and (iii) with a set of dummy variables for the speed of
connections. The speed of DSL connection depends on copper line loss and is the same for all
DSL tariffs in the choice set of an individual consumer. It varies across consumers with the range
of possible values is 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 MB/s, for which dummy variables are constructed. The
speed of FttH connection is assumed to be 100 MB/s for all consumers. The estimation results
are insensitive with respect to the assumption on the speed of FttH connection of 100 MB/s,
which we tested using alternative speed values of 50 and 200 MB/s.13 We cannot estimate a
model which includes both the connection speeds and technology dummy variables because of
collinearity. The first estimation is conducted for a sample of 94,388 consumers and the other
two for a sample of 58,455 consumers due to missing data on the speed of DSL connections for
12We estimate the mixed logit model using Stata procedure mixlogit with 50 Halton draws. See Hole (2007)
for estimation details.
13The log-likelihood value is also lower for models with FttH speed of 50 MB/s and 200MB/s than with 100
MB/s.
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the remaining consumers.
In the first estimation without connection speed, consumers have a positive valuation of DSL
and FttH connections relative to the choice of the outside option. The valuation is higher for
FttH, which is due to higher connection speed. But the valuation of FttH connection may be
also influenced by marketing activities and other factors. Moreover, the valuation depends on
whether consumers live in areas in which cable broadband is available. The availability of cable
broadband reduces the valuation of both DSL and FttH. This may be due to a higher valuation
of the outside option in these geographic areas. Consumers who live in these areas and opt to
leave our operator can get better deals in terms of connection speed and other services. In the
second estimation, with the log of speed and the log of speed interacted with time trend, both
variables are highly significant. Consumers have positive valuation of speed which diminishes
for higher speed values due to logarithmic specification. Moreover, the value of speed increases
over time, which may be due to increasing availability of online services which require high
speed connections. In the third estimation, we use a set of speed dummy variables instead of
log of speed. In addition, these dummy variables are interacted with time trend. The parameter
estimates on all speed dummy variables are very similar, which suggests that consumers have
almost the same valuation of DSL connections with speed of 1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 MB/s. Surprisingly,
the valuation of speed of 100 MB/s is not much higher in the first month in the data.
In February 2014, the second month of our data, the valuation of FttH connection with speed
of 100 MB/s was (8.929 + 0.551 ∗ 2 − 9.748)/9.748 = 2.9% higher than the valuation of DSL
speed of 8 MB/s and 6.9% higher than the valuation of DSL speed of 1 MB/s. In December
2014, the last month of our data, the valuation of FttH connection of 100 MB/s was 59% higher
than the valuation of DSL speed of 8 MB/s and 66% higher than the valuation of DSL speed
of 1 MB/s. The interaction term of dummy variable for FttH speed of 100 MB/s with time
trend is significant and positive, while it is insignificant for DSL speed dummy variables. Thus,
the valuation of high speed access increases over time, which may reflect growing demand for
Internet-based multimedia applications, such as online streaming, data cloud, IPTV and other
bandwidth intensive applications. However, besides fast changes over time, the ratio of speed
valuations in the last month of the data remains far below the ratio of speed values. Thus,
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consumers have diminishing returns to speed, which may be due to the fact that many key
online activities such as emailing, reading news, shopping, browsing and even watching videos
does not require speed above 8 MB/s.
The other coefficients are in general significant with anticipated signs. In particular, the
price coefficient is significant and negative. The estimate of price coefficient may be biased if
consumers who are heavy Internet users tend to choose more expensive FttH tariffs rather than
slower and cheaper DSL tariffs. We mitigate this problem by estimating mixed logit model
and allowing for consumer-specific unobserved price responsiveness. We observe that consumers
differ with respect to price sensitivity since the standard deviation on the price coefficient is
significant for the first and third estimations.
The valuation of the contract length is different for triple play and quadruple play tariffs.
For triple play tariffs, consumers have a negative valuation of 12-month contracts but they
positively value 24-month contracts relative to no commitment. The positive valuation may
be due to the fact that these contracts are targeted at business and self-employed consumers
including tailored features such as dedicated professional portals, significant data storage, fixed
IP address and so on. For quadruple play tariffs, consumers have a negative valuation of 12-
month contracts relative to no commitment, while the coefficient on 24-month is insignificant.
Moreover, consumers have negative valuation of PSTN as a component of triple play offers.
Next, quadruple play tariffs with terminal subsidy are less valued on average. In practice, it
is more costly to purchase a subsidized handset, for which customers pay each month during
the length of their contract, than to purchase a handset without subsidy. Finally, tariffs with
unlimited phone calls are more valued as well as tariffs with higher mobile data allowance.
We find that consumers face significant switching costs between tariffs, which increase when
the remaining commitment period is longer. Moreover, there are additional switching costs
between technologies, from DSL to FttH and the other way around, which in absolute value
are much higher than switching costs between tariffs. As we discussed earlier, the additional
switching cost may be stemming from the fact that appointment with an engineer is needed to
set up the first fiber connection. As shown in Table 3, there are some consumers who switch back
to DSL. Based on information from industry experts, this is due to dissatisfaction with FttH
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connection resulting from noisiness of the modem or aesthetic reasons. Switching costs from
FttH to DSL tariffs are also much higher than between tariffs based on the same technology.
We also find that switching costs to FttH significantly decrease in area in which there is upgraded
cable. This may be due to intense marketing campaign in these areas since the operator tries to
convince consumers to switch from DSL to FttH technology not to lose them to cable offers of
competitors. These marketing campaigns make consumers better informed about the availability
and benefits which fiber brings in terms of higher speed. We also observe that consumers have
different switching costs since the standard deviation on the coefficient of switching costs is
significant for all three estimations.
4.1 Counterfactual Simulations
There is an ongoing debate on how to incentivize development of fiber networks, in which one
of the key issues is the substitution between DSL and FttH technologies. We use the model
to conduct a series of counterfactual simulations to contribute to this debate. In particular,
we analyze the role of connection speed, price and switching costs in the transition from DSL
to FttH technology. Price and speed differentiate the commercial offer of both technologies, so
we should understand how much premium are consumers willing to pay for high speed FttH
connection. A related question is whether DSL operators should upgrade connections to VDSL
or ADSL+ technologies with speed between 8 and 50 MB/s in areas in which FttH will not be
deployed anytime soon. The opinions on this issue are mixed. The argument against is that
VDSL may delay deployment of fiber network. The argument in support is that higher VDSL
speed has an immediate positive effect on welfare and increases consumer awareness of speed,
which may stimulate further migration to high speed FttH technology. Moreover, for rapid
transition process, the price difference should also take into consideration the magnitude of
switching costs between tariffs and technologies. We found that there are substantial switching
costs which may hold consumers back from changing tariffs, operators and from adopting FttH
technology. Thus, to assess the role of speed and price for technology transition without the
interference of switching costs, we need to simulate outcomes in the absence of switching costs.
We conduct the following counterfactual simulations. First, we assess the role of switching
17
costs. The shares of FttH are predicted by setting different switching costs to zero and holding
prices and speeds unchanged. Second, we analyze the role of connection speed in the presence
and absence of switching costs. For these two cases, we predict shares of FttH for different
values of speed of DSL connections in the range between 1 MB/s and 8 MB/s. We also make
predictions of FttH shares for speed of DSL connections of 50 MB/s, which is achievable by
VDSL technology.14 Third, we analyze the role of price difference between DSL and FttH tariffs
for technology transition.
In the first counterfactual shown in Table 6, we assume that there are no additional switching
costs to FttH technology by setting their coefficient to zero. In the second counterfactual, we
assume that there are no switching costs between tariffs but there are additional switching
costs to FttH and DSL technologies. In the third counterfactual, we assume that there are
no switching costs at all. In the current base case in December 2014, the share of FttH in
the sample of consumers is 29%. The penetration of FttH would increase to 54% in the first
counterfactual, would stay at 29% in the second counterfactual and would increase to 91% in
the third counterfactual. The average consumer surplus would increase by 14.9 Euros in the first
case, 8.45 Euros in the second case and 44.4 Euros in the third case. Based on these estimates
we can conclude that switching costs between technologies have the greatest impact and slow
down the transition process from DSL to FttH. Switching costs between tariffs, which may be
due to transaction costs, uncertainty and lack of information also play a role but in combination
with switching costs between technologies.
Next, we simulate the shares of FttH connections when speed of all DSL connections is
downgraded or upgraded in the presence of switching costs. The possible DSL speed values are
1, 2, 5, 7, 8 MB/s. Table 4 shows that most DSL consumers have access to speed of 5 MB/s
and above. As shown in Table 6, compared to the base case in December 2014, the share of
FttH connections would not change at all for speed of all DSL connections ranging between
1 and 8 MB/s. Even if speed of all DSL connections would increase to 50 MB/s, which can
be achieved by VDSL technology, the share of FttH connections would remain unchanged. As
14This counterfactual scenario is not very realistic because VDSL technology is only available to consumers
living very close to the exchange.
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shown in Table 7, degrading DSL speed to 1 MB/s would cause an average loss in consumer
surplus of 4.4 Euros and upgrading speed to 8 MB/s would result in an average gain in consumer
surplus of 1.75 Euros. Furthermore, upgrading DSL speed to 50 MB/s would result in an average
gain in consumer surplus of 21.1 Euros. On this basis, we can conclude that changing speed of
DSL connections in the presence of switching costs will have no effect on the adoption of FttH
technology but offering consumers higher speed will increase their welfare.
High switching costs may explain why there is no effect of DSL speed on FttH adoption. We
repeat the counterfactual simulations but set all switching costs to zero before changing speed
of all DSL connections. The share of FttH connections is not influenced by DSL speed in the
range between 1 and 8 MB/s, as compared to the case without switching costs. Only when the
speed of all DSL connections increases to 50 MB/s, the share of FttH connections is lower by 14
percentage points than in the benchmark case without switching costs. Thus, the speed of DSL
slows down diffusion of FttH only for speed which is achievable by VDSL technology. At the
same time, the average consumer surplus in the absence of switching costs with DSL speed of 1
MB/s is smaller by about (44.4 - 43.4) = 1.0 Euros than the average consumer surplus in the
benchmark case without switching costs, while for DSL speed of 8 MB/s there is a gain of (44.9
- 44.4) = 0.5 Euros. Finally, for DSL speed of 50 MB/s we get an average gain in consumer
surplus of (53.4 - 44.4) = 9.0 Euros.
Finally, we analyze how price difference between DSL and FttH tariffs, which is about 5
Euros, influences the share of FttH connections. We find that if prices of FttH tariffs were 5
Euros lower, the share of FttH connections would remain unchanged in the presence of switching
costs. In the absence of technology switching costs, the share of FttH connections would increase
by 30 percentage points to 59%, and in the absence of all switching costs, it would increase by 64
percentage points to 93%. Thus, matching prices of FttH and DSL increases the share of FttH
connections only by 5 percentage points relative to the benchmark in the absence of technology
switching costs and only by 2 percentage points in the absence of all switching costs.
Overall, our counterfactual simulations illustrate that the values of DSL speed in the range
between 1 and 8 MB/s has almost no impact on consumers decisions to adopt FttH technology.
Only an increase in DSL speed to 50 MB/s, which can be available to some consumers via VDSL
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technology, would decrease the share of FttH connections by 14 percentage points but in the
absence of switching costs. At the same time, there is a large gain in consumer surplus from
increasing DSL speeds. We find that there are significant switching costs between tariffs but the
key factor which slows down transition from DSL to FttH are additional switching costs between
technologies. In the absence of additional switching costs to FttH technology, the share of FttH
connections would increase by about 25 percentage points, while eliminating only switching costs
between tariffs would not increase FttH adoption at all. In the absence of all switching costs,
FttH share would increase from 29% to 91%.
5 Conclusions
The roll-out of high-speed Internet is one of the flagship initiatives of Europe 2020 strategy
proposed by the European Commission in 2010 with the objective to reap the benefits of a
digital single market for households and firms. In particular, according to the Digital Agenda
for Europe, by 2020, all EU households should benefit of at least 30 MB/s connection and at
least 50% of EU households should have adopted 100 MB/s connection or more. Moreover, in
September 2016, the Commission announced that by 2025 all European households should have
access to connections with speed of at least 100 MB/s. Such speeds of data transmission are not
feasible using DSL technology which relies on copper networks belonging to former monopolists,
while as of 2014, DSL was used by 59% EU households connected to Internet.
In this paper, we focus on demand factors which may postpone the adoption of high speed
broadband, which are consumer switching costs between tariffs and technologies and low valu-
ation of high connection speed. We analyze the impact of these factors on FttH adoption by
estimating mixed logit model based on monthly data on tariff choices made by customers of a
single European telecommunications operators between January and December 2014. Our anal-
ysis shows there are significant switching costs between tariffs and technologies. In particular,
switching costs from DSL to FttH technology slow down the transition process. These costs
may be due to the time and effort needed to set up the first fiber connection. In particular, a
consumer needs to make appointment with an engineer who must visit the premises to set up
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a connection. Switching costs between tariffs which may be due to transaction costs, uncer-
tainty and lack of information also play a role but in combination with switching costs between
technologies. Thus, even if firms deploy fiber networks, the take up of FttH connections by
consumers may be slow.
Furthermore, we find that the valuation of DSL speed in the range of 1 to 8 MB/s is very
similar, which may be explained by the fact that basic Internet needs of consumers such as
emailing, reading news, shopping, browsing and even watching videos online can be satisfied
with connection speeds below 8 MB/s. Surprisingly, the valuation of FttH speed of 100 MB/s
is not much different than the valuation of DSL speed of 8 MB/s but increases over time. In
February 2014, the second month of our data, the valuation of FttH speed of 100 MB/s was
2.9% higher than the valuation of DSL speed of 8 MB/s and 6.9% higher than the valuation of
DSL speed of 1 MB/s. In December 2014, the last month of our data, the valuation of FttH
connection with speed of 100 MB/s was 59% higher than the valuation of DSL speed of 8 MB/s
and 66% higher than the valuation of DSL speed of 1 MB/s. The increasing valuation over time
may reflect growing need for high speed connections due to availability of new online services.
But besides fast changes over time, the ratio of speed valuations in the last month of the data
remains far below the ratio of speed values.
Our findings show that to achieve the objectives of the Digital Agenda for Europe, there
is need to reduce consumer switching costs between technologies and tariffs and to convince
consumers that they need speed of 100 MB/s or above. If there is a lack of interest on the
side of consumers to give up their slower DSL connections and make a move to faster FttH
technology, also firms will have lower incentives to invest in the deployment of FttH.
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Appendix
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: old and new tariffs
Old tariffs
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Monthly fee (Euros/m) 62.16 25.67 21 141 122
Triple DSL 0.39 0.49 0 1 122
Triple FttH 0.07 0.26 0 1 122
Quadruple DSL 0.34 0.48 0 1 122
Quadruple FttH 0.2 0.4 0 1 122
Handset subsidy 0.32 0.47 0 1 122
Unlimited voice 0.23 0.42 0 1 122
Mobile data allowance (GB) 0.66 1 0 6 122
PSTN 0.14 0.35 0 1 122
Web only 0 0 0 0 122
New tariffs
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Monthly fee (Euros/m) 62.96 26.53 10 147 228
Triple DSL 0.33 0.47 0 1 228
Triple FttH 0.05 0.21 0 1 228
Quadruple DSL 0.35 0.48 0 1 228
Quadruple FttH 0.26 0.44 0 1 228
Handset subsidy 0.47 0.5 0 1 228
Unlimited voice 0.43 0.5 0 1 228
Mobile data allowance (GB) 1.62 2.53 0 10 228
PSTN 0.14 0.35 0 1 228
Web only 0.02 0.13 0 1 228
Table 2: Number of consumers switching tariffs between January and December 2014
Switches Consumers %
0 56,452 60%
1 30,500 32%
2 6,242 7%
3 1,023 1%
4 149 0%
5 21 0%
6 1 0%
Total 94,388 100%
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Table 3: Number of switches between types of tariffs between January and December 2014
From/To Triple DSL Quadruple DSL Triple FttH Quadruple FttH Leaving
Triple DSL 11,508 2,173 6,873 616 562
Quadruple DSL 27 8,486 21 5,195 36
Triple FttH 1,033 9 2,878 2,041 213
Quadruple FttH 12 596 12 5,345 6
New consumers 191 79 405 117 0
Table 4: Copper line loss
Copper line loss Basic DSL speed Consumers
60 dB - 75 dB < 1 Mb/s 1,006
45 dB - 60 dB 2 Mb/s 6,236
30 dB - 45 dB 5 Mb/s 14,164
15 dB - 30 dB 7 Mb/s 23,952
< 15dB 8 Mb/s 13,097
58,455
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Table 5: Estimation results
Est. I Est. II Est. III
Mean Time SD Mean Time SD Mean Time SD
Price -0.070*** 0.025*** -0.014*** -0.000 -0.056*** -0.020***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Contract 12 TP -0.384*** 0.581*** -0.367***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Contract 24 TP 6.071*** 4.601*** 5.131***
(0.035) (0.028) (0.040)
Contract 12 QP -1.082*** -2.576*** -2.756***
(0.055) (0.042) (0.048)
Contract 24 QP -0.140** -1.143*** -1.666***
(0.065) (0.057) (0.065)
Subsidy 0.210*** -0.726*** -0.009
(0.047) (0.050) (0.058)
Unlimited 1.480*** 0.670*** 0.206***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.028)
Data mobile 0.370*** 0.074*** 0.311***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
PSTN -0.665*** 0.970*** -0.475***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Switching -3.233*** -1.192*** -3.812*** -1.177*** -3.423*** -1.127***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018)
Switching to DSL -3.914*** -2.368*** -4.609***
(0.232) (0.411) (0.413)
Switching to FttH -11.595*** -16.747*** -11.641***
(0.582) (1.005) (1.002)
Switching to FttH (cable zone) -10.659*** -14.042*** -9.856***
(0.230) (0.272) (0.264)
Switching commitment -0.131*** -0.108*** -0.125***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leaving commitment -0.079*** 0.192*** -0.073***
(0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
DSL TP 10.297***
(0.096)
DSL TP (cable zone) 10.300***
(0.093)
DSL QP 7.637***
(0.105)
DSL QP (cable zone) 7.407***
(0.101)
FttH TP 10.644***
(0.108)
FttH TP (cable zone) 10.642***
(0.099)
FttH QP 6.925***
(0.118)
FttH QP (cable zone) 7.079***
(0.109)
DSL TP+QP -0.000
(0.011)
FttH TP+QP 0.517***
(0.013)
Log speed 0.710*** 0.252***
(0.011) (0.003)
Speed DSL 1 MB/s 9.381*** -0.015
(0.310) (0.046)
Speed DSL 2 MB/s 9.686*** -0.013
(0.160) (0.023)
Speed DSL 5 MB/s 9.578*** 0.011
(0.131) (0.018)
Speed DSL 7 MB/s 9.580*** 0.034**
(0.121) (0.016)
Speed DSL 8 MB/s 9.748*** 0.007
(0.133) (0.018)
Speed FttH 100 MB/s 8.929*** 0.551***
(0.118) (0.016)
Observations 3,998,727 2,483,988 2,483,988
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6: Share of FttH subscriptions
Month (0) Current (1) No FttH (2) No tariff (3) No (4) 50MB/s (5) 50MB/s (6) 1MB/s (7) 1MB/s (8) 8MB/s (9) 8MB/s (10) −5 Euro (11) −5 Euro (12) −5 Euro
situation SC SC SC with SC no SC with SC no SC with SC no SC SC no FttH SC no SC
2 21% 21% 23% 23% 20% 14% 21% 24% 21% 22% 21% 21% 24%
3 21% 21% 20% 28% 21% 17% 21% 29% 21% 28% 21% 21% 30%
4 21% 22% 21% 32% 21% 22% 21% 33% 21% 31% 21% 22% 33%
5 22% 23% 22% 38% 21% 28% 21% 41% 21% 37% 21% 23% 41%
6 22% 25% 23% 48% 22% 31% 22% 53% 22% 46% 22% 26% 54%
7 23% 28% 23% 55% 23% 34% 23% 59% 23% 53% 23% 30% 59%
8 24% 34% 24% 72% 23% 41% 24% 76% 24% 70% 24% 36% 77%
9 25% 36% 25% 74% 24% 46% 25% 76% 25% 72% 25% 37% 77%
10 26% 38% 26% 80% 26% 55% 26% 82% 26% 79% 26% 40% 82%
11 27% 43% 28% 86% 27% 67% 28% 88% 28% 85% 28% 47% 88%
12 29% 54% 29% 91% 29% 77% 29% 92% 29% 90% 29% 59% 93%
Share of FttH subscriptions in: (0) current situation; (1) without switching costs to FttH technology; (2)
without tariff switching costs; (3) without all switching costs; (4) DSL speed upgraded to 50MB/s; (5) DSL
speed upgraded to 50MB/s and no switching costs; (6) DSL speed degraded to 1MB/s; (7) DSL speed degraded
to 1MB/s and no switching costs; (8) DSL speed upgraded to 8MB/s; (9) DSL speed upgraded to 8MB/s and no
switching costs; (10) FttH price lowered by 5 Euros; (11) FttH price lowered by 5 Euros and no switching costs
to FttH technology; (12) FttH price lowered by 5 Euros and no switching costs.
Table 7: Changes in average consumer surplus in Euros
Month (1) No FttH (2) No tariff (3) No (4) 50MB/s (5) 50MB/s (6) 1MB/s (7) 1MB/s (8) 8MB/s (9) 8MB/s (10) −5 Euro (11) −5 Euro
SC SC SC with SC no SC with SC no SC with SC no SC no SC with SC
2 0.00 -9.86 -9.86 -23.58 -32.71 4.76 -6.85 -1.93 -11.41 -5.00 -14.86
3 -0.73 -9.15 -14.34 -23.56 -35.27 4.87 -11.71 -1.96 -15.70 -5.00 -19.34
4 -1.13 -8.41 -15.71 -23.42 -34.96 4.85 -13.35 -1.95 -16.94 -5.00 -20.71
5 -1.73 -8.64 -18.53 -23.28 -36.05 4.81 -16.45 -1.94 -19.63 -5.00 -23.53
6 -2.31 -8.59 -20.32 -23.07 -36.73 4.77 -18.39 -1.92 -21.33 -5.00 -25.32
7 -3.48 -9.00 -24.46 -22.85 -39.01 4.73 -22.79 -1.90 -25.33 -5.00 -29.46
8 -5.18 -8.61 -28.40 -22.64 -41.42 4.69 -26.93 -1.88 -29.18 -5.00 -33.40
9 -6.26 -8.87 -30.85 -22.35 -43.05 4.62 -29.49 -1.86 -31.57 -5.00 -35.85
10 -9.03 -8.71 -35.95 -21.92 -46.54 4.54 -34.78 -1.82 -36.55 -5.00 -40.95
11 -11.09 -8.62 -39.03 -21.55 -49.04 4.46 -37.93 -1.79 -39.60 -5.00 -44.03
12 -14.90 -8.45 -44.37 -21.10 -53.43 4.37 -43.40 -1.75 -44.87 -5.00 -49.37
Change in average consumer surplus relative to current situation: (1) without switching costs to FttH
technology; (2) without tariff switching costs; (3) without all switching costs; (4) DSL speed upgraded to
50MB/s; (5) DSL speed upgraded to 50MB/s and no switching costs; (6) DSL speed degraded to 1MB/s; (7)
DSL speed degraded to 1MB/s and no switching costs; (8) DSL speed upgraded to 8MB/s; (9) DSL speed
upgraded to 8MB/s and no switching costs; (10) FttH price lowered by 5 Euros; (11) FttH price lowered by 5
Euros and no switching costs to FttH technology; (12) FttH price lowered by 5 Euros and no switching costs.
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